Introduction
The establishment of a common currency union fueled a lively debate about labor market reforms and its effects on competitiveness and trade imbalances within the Euro area. Detractors argue that a common currency shuts down one important channel of adjustment, the nominal exchange rate. Countries within a common currency union are unable to restore a loss in international competitiveness -for instance due to labor market reforms in its partner countries -through changes in their monetary policy.
This paper contributes to this discussion by analyzing the effects of labor market reforms on international competitiveness in a model that features a continuum of industries and heterogeneous workers. The latter facilitates to distinguish between labor market reforms that have similar effects on high-and low-skilled workers and labor market reforms that are skill-biased in that they have different effects on different skill-groups. The aim of this second exercise is to evaluate the spillover effects on income and unemployment in groups that are affected indirectly. Our thoughtexperiment will focus on the effects of a reform that reduce the low-skill workers' outside option through lower unemployment benefits. 1 Wages in the low-income group are directly affected by this reform, which leads to a reduction in unemployment. Competitiveness is affected through production costs. Lower unit labor costs at home are associated with increasing competitiveness and an expansion of the production to industries formerly associated with the foreign country. The direct effect on high-skilled is negligible simply because unemployment benefits are less relevant for the skilled workers. However, labor demand is increasing due to the expansion of production to formerly inactive industries. A surge in demand for both types of workers can only be met by lower unemployment and higher wages. For the low-skilled the effect is ambiguous. The unemployment rate decreases through the direct effect which might be already enough to restore the labor market clearing condition. Yet, high-skill workers benefit from the labor market reform due to higher demand for high-skilled labor associated with a surge in wages.
There exists a wide range of stylized facts that motivate this study. Krugman (2012) for instance argues that capital flows from Europe's core to Europe's South (for instance in form of foreign direct investments) led to wage increases in the South 2 .
This soar in capital flows to the South can be explained by an anticipated lower 1 Other skill-specific institutional changes could be for instance minimum wages within certain occupational groups or sectors, or employment protection that mainly affect low-skill workers. 2 "... there were massive flows of capital from Europe's core to its booming periphery. These inflows of capital fed booms that in turn led to rising wages: in the decade after the euros creation, unit labor costs (wages adjusted for productivity) rose about 35 percent in southern Europe, compared with a rise of only 9 percent in Germany. Manufacturing in Europe's south became uncompetitive, which in turn meant that the countries that were attracting huge money inflows began running correspondingly huge trade deficits." (Krugman, 2012, chapter 10) risk for investments into the South after its entry into the European community.
Krugman also points out that -at the same time -wages in Germany grew at a much lower rate, associated with a relative shift in competitiveness from the South to Germany.
Back in the early 2000s, Germany initiated a huge labor market reform program that affected a broad array of labor market institutions and slowed down wage growth in non-manufacturing sectors. It is unlikely that those reforms had a great impact on high-skill unemployment rates, mainly due to the fact that high-skill unemployment was already low before the government intervention. Furthermore, reemployment in case of job separation is more likely for high-than for low-skilled. Still, those labor market reforms can explain why wages in Germany grew at a much lower rate of 9 percent compared to the 35 percent growth rates found for Southern Europe. This was mainly through its effect on low-skilled workers.
But is there any evidence which type of worker was affected mostly? The stylized facts for Germany presented in Dustmann et al. (2009) suggest that wage growth at the bottom of the distribution was stagnant or even negative, whereas wages at the top of the distribution were rising shortly after 2000. A reduced outside option for workers due to a labor market reform is a potential explanation for stagnating or even decreasing wages if workers have to search for employers and if unemployment is high. The less likely reemployment in case of job separation, the more important the outside option gets for a worker. Rising wages at the top of the distribution suggest little impact of those institutional reforms in the high income group.
The model in this paper distinguishes between low-and high-skill workers but unemployment benefits for instance are modeled as flow values. Thus, an equal change in unemployment benefits equally affects both skill groups, which is highly unrealistic. We address this issue by assuming that unemployment benefits of the high-skilled remain unaffected by the labor market reform. Workers at the top of the income distribution may have more assets that are generated outside the firm which should be accounted for in the flow value of being unemployed. This is a shortcoming of the standard search and matching framework with more than two skill-groups.
The stylized facts also fit the evolution of skill-specific unemployment. We can observe a massive decrease in low-skill specific unemployment, whereas high-skill specific rates were erratic at a constant low level. This pattern is consistent with labor market reforms that mainly affected low-skilled workers.
The analysis of those effects builds on a multi-industry North-South trade model that goes back to Hanson (1996, 1997) , FH model henceforth. All monetary variables, such as wages or prices, are expressed in a common currency and the lack of a financial market rules out any kind of exchange rate policy. Thus, changes in wages directly affect production costs and the country's competitiveness, which is close to a common currency union. Hanson (1996, 1997 ) approach due to the distinction between low-and high-skill workers, which facilitates an analysis of skill-specific institutional spillover effects. A government can increase its country's competitiveness by influencing wages and unemploy-ment of the low-skilled through less stringent labor market institutions concerning low-skilled workers only. It will be shown that such a policy improves the position of high-skilled workers, while low-skilled loose in terms of wages but benefit in terms of employment through its feedback effects at the extensive margin, where shifts in competitiveness between countries lead to shifts of production from one country to another. Therefore, increasing labor demand at the extensive margin translate into job creation in industries that were formerly inactive within the respective country.
Two closely related papers also investigate the link between trade, capital flows and labor market institutions. Beissinger (2001) To summarize the stylized facts discussed in the motivation, standard labor market models predict that a higher capital to labor ratio rises labor productivity and thus 
The benchmark model
The model is general equilibrium and features two countries that are integrated into a common currency union. Thus, all nominal variables are expressed in terms of a common currency and the total GDP generated within the union is normalized to unity. Effects arising through trade with non-members are not studied in the underlying paper.
Both countries can produce the same continuum of goods but we will show that countries can also specialize on a certain range of goods and trade them internationally. Final good assemblers or downstream producers use high-and low-skill specific intermediates and capital as input for the final good production. High-skill Consumer preferences. Following Hanson (1996, 1997) preferences for x(z) are modeled by
where x(z) denotes the amount of goods demanded from industry z and ϕ(z) is industry z's Cobb Douglas consumption share. 4 The aggregate consumption good is produced without costs and sold for an aggregate price level P. Prices and wages are jointly determined by upstream producers, workers, and downstream producers. Aggregate demand for the final output good equals total expenditure YP = E. The aggregate demand function (1) implies that a constant fraction ϕ(z) of world expenditure is spent on the consumption of good z. Thus, consumer demand for output generated in industry z reads as
The share of expenditure spent for that particular industry z is equal to the revenue generated in the respective industry. Perfect competition implies that total revenue in industry z is equal to the quantity produced, x(z), times unit costs, κ(z). One can solve the standard utility maximization problem of the representative consumer who maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint, which depends upon prices, consumption, and income available for consumption. The first order condition of the utility maximization problem implies equation (2).
Final consumption goods producers
We borrow the heterogeneous worker concept from Hanson (1996, 1997) by assuming that goods are produced in a continuum of industries using the input factors capital, high-, and low-skill workers. However, the model setup is different in so far that workers are not directly used by the final output good producers. Instead those final goods are produced using intermediates obtained from small firms hiring either low-or high-skill workers. The input coefficients which determine input of intermediates in the production in z are given exogenously. 5 Goods in the continuum are ranked according to their skill intensities a h (z) and a l (z), both described by linear functions increasing in z. The assumption that the input coefficient curves that pin down low-and high-skill labor requirement are both steeper in the home country than in the foreign country give rise to gains from trade and determine the free trade pattern that stems from cross-country differences in production costs. Countries produce goods where they have a comparative advantage by means of lower unit costs compared to the unit costs in the competing country. However, it is sensible to link the input requirement curves to relative factor endowments so that, on average, low-skill abundant countries have a relatively higher low-skill labor demand in all industries. In the following, all countries are assumed to be low-skill abundant and therefore all industries have higher low-skill requirement on average. 6 The functional form of both input coefficient curves is
where i is the country identifier, l denotes low-, and h denotes high-skill. In the following we will use k as an index for skill, which can take the values l or h. For the input coefficients we assume that α is a country-specific constant and γ denotes the industry specific component of labor requirement depending on z. Moreover, industries are ranked according to unit costs, which implies that γ i > 0. Parameter ψ > 0 is a shift parameter that relates low-and high-skill demand. Similar to Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) the final intermediate good is assembled according to the nested Leontief production function
Input over high-and low-skill intermediates is assumed to be Leontief, which implies that the relation between high-and low-skill intermediates is fixed. The ag- 
Downstream producer prices equal production costs depending on the firm's input coefficients, wages earned by workers producing intermediates for the upstream producers, and search cost paid by upstream producers in order to recruit workers. Goods are ordered according to their relative skill intensity. We know that intermediate good prices are equalized over the whole continuum. This implies that the ranking of industries according to production costs solely depends on the input coefficients, which are exogenously given and increasing in z. Wages in both countries are equalized across sectors z but not across skill groups. Each firm has to pay q h for high-skill intermediate goods and q L for low-skill intermediates. Intermediate goods' prices are taken as given in the final production stage and set in the stage below where firms use high-and low-skill labor to produce the intermediates.
Downstream producers adjust their labor demand with respect to prices charged by upstream producers. Perfect competition implies that the industry price level equals the respective industry unit costs
where D = ζ −ζ (1 − ζ) −(1−ζ) and κ(z) denotes minimum unit costs in sector z obtained by solving the standard cost minimization problem for firms producing according to the production function (5). Labor markets are not perfect. Employers and employees have to be matched to each other and firms have to post vacancies before hiring workers. Bargaining between firms and workers is separated according to the workers' skills without intra firm bargaining across skills. Though, there is an interaction between highand low-skill workers since upstream producers take downstream retail prices into consideration when negotiating wages. Equation (5) implies that there is no substitution between high-and low-skill workers as both inputs are used in a certain relation. Thus, firms' revenue is zero if bargaining with one or the other type of worker fails. Even if the relation in the production process is different, their importance for the revenue generated is equal because the real amount of both input factors is equal in production. Factors with higher input coefficients are more productive and therefore less units are used. Given that the price for the intermediate good depends on wages paid by upstream producers, labor market clearing hinges on a certain pair of equilibrium market tightness to secure that revenue generated by the downstream producers is exactly equal to κ i (z)x i (z).
Search and matching between workers and intermediate producers
Intermediate input prices. Since the product market equilibrium depends on the labor market equilibrium more clarification is needed to shed light on the implications from vacancy posting costs for intermediate input prices. Firms can pay vacancy posting costs in terms of income, in terms of the good produced by the respective firm, aggregate price or in terms of the wage rate. The Pissarides (2000) assumption that vacancy posting costs are paid in terms of goods' prices is used in the following sections in order to solve for a unique equilibrium. 
b) An increase in the equilibrium market tightness θ k directly affects wages and thus intermediate good prices. The effect is positive since the partial derivative firm assumption implies that each high-skill (low-skill) specific intermediate good is
produced by a firm that employs exactly one high-skilled (low-skilled) worker. Firms have to post vacancies in order to recruit new workers, which incurs vacancy posting costs c. We follow Pissarides (2000) in so far that we assume that vacancy posting costs are paid in terms of intermediate good prices. As an alternative, firms' recruitment costs could be paid in terms of the numéraire good. The conclusions drawn from the comparative static exercise in section 3 would not change.
Apparently, to let firms pay recruitment costs as share of revenue generated within the firm instead of world income, which is the numéraire in our setup, is a more reasonable assumption.
The matching process itself is modeled according to a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function m(θ k ), which is concave and has constant returns to scale properties. The labor market tightness θ k is skill-specific. The higher the number of posted job vacancies v relative to the number of job seekers u within a certain skillgroup, the more potential matches will be created but the lower the success rate of a match. The equilibrium market tightness governs wages and unemployment through the Beveridge-curve, the Wage-curve, and the Job-creation condition. The
Wage-and the Job Creation-curves are derived as in Pissarides (2000).
Job Creation. J k in (10) denotes the present discounted value of expected profits from an occupied job in skill group k, V k in (11) denotes the value of a vacant job in skill group k, and η denotes the exogenously given discount rate. 8 The value of a vacant job negatively depends on unit recruitment costs but increases in the difference between the value of the filled job and the opportunity costs given by the value of the vacant job. The matching function itself pins down the probability of a successful match due to the assumption of constant returns to scale. The flow value of the filled job is revenue generated by the worker minus the wage rate paid to the worker. 9 Job separation due to an exogenous shock hits the firm with poisson arrival rate λ and destroys the value associated with that firm, which reads as
At this stage we do not know whether per-worker revenue, (z), is equal across industries. In equilibrium the value of unoccupied jobs is zero since firms continue to post vacancies until all profits are exploited
It is sufficient to compute the optimal wage/equilibrium market tightness for the cutoff firm. However, unit costs/prices differ across firms in different industries.
The Job Creation curve reads
Wage Curve. The worker evaluates a job based on the offered wage and the opportunity cost of accepting the wage offer. The value of the job becomes zero if the job is destroyed. The worker receives the value of her outside option worth ηU k in case of job separation, depending on the flow value of being unemployed b k = τ k + ι k B. Following Pissarides (2000) we assume that unemployment benefits, B, enter the flow value of being unemployed additively. Moreover, we assume that high-skilled workers do not take unemployment benefits into their consideration. Hence, changes in unemployment benefits do not affect their outside option.
The parameter ι k is an indicator variable that can take the value zero if a workers assets are higher than a certain threshold so that unemployment benefits are irrelevant for them. For skill-biased labor market reforms we assume that high-skilled workers are above that ceiling so that they do not receive any additional income from the government in case of getting unemployed. The intuition behind that is the assumption that unemployment benefits are low relative to their permanent income and thus relatively unimportant. In addition, we assume that all other values of being unemployed, τ k , are skill-specific as well and such that τ h > τ l . Workers find new jobs with a certain probability that depends on the market tightness, which translates into
We follow Dutt et al. (2009) and introduce W e k in order to take into account that workers are randomly matched to firms and therefore have to build expectations about W. This also implies that all firms pay the same wage rate and hence only differ with respect to production. Wages itself are bargained and satisfy the bargaining condition
Thus, the distribution of total gains depends on the workers' bargaining power, β, so that the equilibrium bargaining outcome must satisfy
It can be shown that the existence of recruitment costs increases wages through the outside option. An unsuccessful match incurs additional recruitment costs which is anticipated by the workers
We obtain a wage condition by combining the equilibrium conditions (18) and (17) as shown in the appendix to solve for
which is equivalent to the labor supply curve in the standard Hanson (1996, 1997) model.
Equilibrium in the high-skill intermediate sector.
In equilibrium, the wage and the equilibrium market tightness θ k are determined by interacting the wage curve and the job creation curve so that
Simplifying then yields
Therefore, equation (21) implies that all downstream producers pay the same price
Intermediate good prices only depend on exogenous parameters and the equilibrium market tightness, which is common to all firms in all industries. Moreover, we suppose that the discount rate η and the capital rental r are tied to the capital rental and we assume that the discount rate is predetermined by the capital rental. 
We denote the price paid by downstream producers for the purchase of low-skill Part b) of Proposition 1 is easily proved by deriving the first derivative of the labor market equilibrium condition with respect to θ k , which is increasing since the vacancy filling rate is decreasing in the equilibrium market tightness
Thus the first derivative of (8) and (9) with respect to θ k is positive.
Skill-specific unemployment. Solving the product and labor market equilibrium pins down the low-and high-skill equilibrium market tightness and unemployment in both countries via the skill-specific Beveridge curves
The Applying Shephard's Lemma the demand for produced intermediates is equal to
Domestic labor market equilibrium requires that labor demand at the aggregate level is equal to total labor supply which is satisfied if
and If we allow for free trade both countries are better off by specializing on production in sectors where they have a comparative advantage. A free trade equilibrium requires one unique cutoff z * ∈ (0, 1) for which each of the four labor markets is in equilibrium and for which the cutoff condition
is fulfilled.
However, each cutoff z * ∈ [0, ∞] is associated with one unique combination of θ l and θ h . Thus, a necessary requirement for the free trade equilibrium is a cutoff associated with a combination of equilibrium market tightness parameters for which all labor markets clear and for which domestic equals foreign unit costs. Obviously, there is no upper bound for z which means that -given the exogenous parameters -such a cutoff might be outside the feasible space of industries, which is restricted to lie within the continuum z ∈ [0, 1]. If the cutoff condition is fulfilled for z * > 1 only, we would obtain a corner solution where one country could produce all goods cheaper. In that case there are no incentives for one of the countries to participate in international trade so that both economies remain under autarky and produce the whole continuum domestically. Both cost schedules are increasing in z. Thus, an increase in the capital rental or the intermediate goods shift the unit cost schedules up. This shift in unit costs over the whole continuum will result in a loss of the comparative advantage in some industries located close to the former cutoff, resulting in a shift of z * .
We assume that the input coefficient curves are such that home has a comparative advantage in industries closer to the lower bound of industries, whereas foreign has a comparative advantage in industries closer to the upper bound of industries. This assumption allows us to write the labor market clearing conditions as a function of the cutoff z * .
Prices of high-and low-skill intermediates depend on the endogenous equilibrium market tightness, and some exogenous parameters only. q can be substituted in the labor market clearing condition so that this condition only depends on θ k . Following Hanson (1996, 1997) we exploit equation (2) and (7) in order to link the labor-, and product-market equilibrium at home and foreign via
Thus, the number of matches equals the number of available intermediate goods.
The consumption share for each industry z is constant and by assumption equalized over the whole continuum.
Existence of an unique equilibrium. Labor market clearing requires that labor demand equals labor supply in each country and skill group. The labor market clearing conditions therefore determine four θ ik 's, and each θ ik in turn pins down the respective wage and skill-specific unemployment rate. The equilibrium is unique since there exists exactly one pair of equilibrium market tightness in each country that satisfies all 2 × 2 labor market clearing conditions for a given cutoff z * .
To see that an unique equilibrium exists we let Γ L denote the left-, and Γ R the right hand side of the labor market clearing condition. We further define
The left hand side of both labor market clearing conditions has its origin in zero and converges to an upper bound. The right hand side is also well behaved. Labor demand is decreasing in θ k . An increase in θ k triggers an increase in intermediate input good prices, which in turn reduces demand for intermediates. We compute the partial effects by application of the Leibniz rule to the right hand side of the labor market clearing condition and assuming that the bounds of the integral being constant yields
where world income is set as numéraire so that E = 1. 10 The first derivative approaches 0 when q k goes to infinity and ∂ 2 Γ R ∂q 2 k > 0. Therefore, firms' labor demand is decreasing in θ k and converges to zero. Intermediate good prices converge towards the positive constant b k if θ k approaches zero but go to infinity when θ approachesθ k which is defined as βθ k + η+λ m(θ k ) = (1−β) c . Labor demand is thus positive for θ k = 0 and converges to zero when θ approachesθ k . Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium. Notice, that there is an interaction between the low-and high-skill
labor market clearing condition. The high-skill labor market tightness shifts low-skill labor demand Γ R through the increase in the wage rate that enters both groups' labor market clearing condition. in both skill groups. The focus lies on the interaction between equilibrium market tightness θ k and labor demand / supply. For the sake of clarity we assume that the labor supply function Γ L are equal in both sectors. 11 A change in one skill group's equilibrium market tightness also affects the respectively other skill-groups 10 Note that this normalization helps to solve some ambiguities. However, as shown later on world income does not change by much due to some countervailing effects of FDI on both countries' wages. 11 That would be the case if matching functions and labor endowments are equal for both high-and Γ R . The equilibrium is unique since Γ L has its origin at zero and converges to the upper bound whereas Γ R converges to zero when θ k goes to infinity. Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 follows directly from the first derivative of the right hand side of the labor market clearing condition with respect of z * , which is positive or negative depending on whether z * is the upper or lower bound of the integral. Notice, that for each country we ex-ante know whether z * is the upper or lower bound from the assumptions about the country's technology parameters which are exogenous. In the two country scenario, both countries have one constant bound (either 0 or 1) and one variable bound z * . We assume that home has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 0 and foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 1. Therefore, for the home country z * is the upper bound of active industries. Changing the bounds and deriving the first derivative with respect to z * therefore yields
for home and
for foreign, respectively. An increase in the cutoff industry thus reduces labor demand at the extensive margin due to a reduction in active industries.
General equilibrium
To close the model we still have to determine world income and capital returns.
Income is normalized to unity and equals world factor payments in country d (domestic) and f (foreign)
The capital rental is determined exploiting the Cobb Douglas shares and Shephard's Lemma again
low-skilled. Differences in endowments would shift Γ L without affecting the shape of the curves.
Our institutional variables as unemployment benefits, search costs, or the bargaining power of the workers do not affect the labor supply curves directly.
Thus, the fraction ζ is spent for intermediates which gives us
Both equilibrium conditions can be solved for E in order to derive
Hence, the equilibrium depends on 8 endogenous variables: 4 equilibrium market tightness, capital return in the foreign and home country, one cutoff, as well as world income. We follow Hanson (1996, 1997) setting world income as numéraire so that we can drop one equilibrium condition as suggested by Walras' law.
Comparative statics
This section analyzes the effects of unilateral changes in labor market institutions on trade, foreign direct investment, and inequality. Labor market institutional changes in the extended FH framework affect a country's competitiveness through production costs. This change in competitiveness not only affects the reforming country's labor market, it also affects foreign labor markets at the extensive margin. Interest rates are treated as exogenous. A reduction in unemployment benefits for instance shifts the unit cost schedule down, followed by adjustments at the extensive margin through an expansion of production at home.
Institutional reforms always affect skill-specific unemployment in both the low-and the high-skill group directly through the wage setting mechanism and/or indirectly through the adjustments at the extensive margin.
Moreover, we distinguish between institutional changes that have equal effects on both skill-groups and institutional changes that are skill-biased. Governments for instance may finance special vocational retraining programs that help workers to switch occupations. Skill-biased effects of changes in the replacement rate are less obvious. Here we assume that high-skilled workers do not take unemployment benefits into consideration due to their higher wealth and higher reemployment opportunities in case of separation.
Non skill-biased effects of institutional reforms
As shown in the appendix, all policies that intend to reduce the workers' labor standards partially increase wages and unemployment in the search and matching framework. This is associated with an downward shift of the unit cost schedule for downstream producers. The direct effect comes along with indirect adjustments in wages through the change of the equilibrium market tightness. It will be shown that the indirect effect will not overcompensate the direct effect although both effects go into opposite directions so that the unit cost schedule shifts down following the direct effect of institutions on wages. Although we assume that changes in labor market institutions are unilateral, spillover effects influence labor markets in countries integrated via trade and FDI. We will focus on the effects of lower unemployment benefits.
Proposition 2. a) An unilateral decrease in unemployment benefits B i directly reduces both skill groups' wages through the workers' outside option. Unemployment in country i decreases accompanied by a rise in wages due to the increasing equilibrium market tightness, which mitigates the direct effect. Lower production costs lead to increased competitiveness at home through a higher z * . b) Country j = i's capital outflows and loss in competitiveness will increase its unemployment but reduce employees' wages in both skill groups.
Proof. a) Wages and unemployment are affected through three different channels. The direct effect works through the reduction of the outside option, which directly reduces wages and thus intermediate input good prices as derived in the appendix.
To derive the direct effect of the policy intervention, we made the assumption that the equilibrium market tightness and the cutoff remain unchanged. Two indirect effects that also affect wages and intermediate good prices in the second round mitigate this direct effect. Suppose that the cutoff remains unchanged and remember that world income is not affected by assumption. 12 The equilibrium market tightness must increase in order to restore equilibrium through a lower rate of unemployment, which mitigates the direct effect derived in the appendix. However, the indirect effect cannot overcompensate the direct effect as discussed separately in the next paragraph. A third effect arises through the adjustments in the cutoff z * . Lower unemployment benefits reduce wages and thus production costs, which boosts the country's competitiveness and increases the cutoff z * . This third effect arises only if the direct effect of the institutional change decreases intermediate good prices, which is the case. Moreover, both effects go into the same direction, which implies that labor demand is increasing at the intensive (direct minus indirect effect) and extensive margin. The effect is thus unambiguous.
The direct and the indirect effects. We have seen that a decline in unemployment benefits reduces wages and hence intermediate good prices, which stimulates labor demand through higher demand for intermediates.
We can use the labor market clearing conditions to prove that the direct effect must dominate the indirect effects so that the unit cost schedule is still shifting down. We begin by substituting the high-skill specific input coefficient by equation (4) . The input coefficients drop out so that the labor market clearing conditions collapse to
It is straightforward to show that a decrease in unemployment benefits decreases high-and low-skill specific wages and thus intermediate good prices directly. The right hand sides of equations (42) and (43) increase in the first round through this partial effect of the change in institutions on wages as derived in the appendix.
The left hand has to adjust accordingly. First of all we assume that the cutoff remains constant in order to show the effects of the change of the denominator at the right hand side, which is decreasing so that [q ld (θ ld ) + ψq hd (θ hd )] < [q ld (θ ld ) + ψq hd (θ hd )]. Prime is the level of the denominator right after the direct effect of the reform. The cutoff will rise iff the denominator is lower after the labor market reform. The effect is the same for both skill groups so that we have to focus on only one skill group. We choose the low-skilled, where we find
Unemployment has to decrease in order to restore labor market equilibrium, which will lead to a decrease of the right hand side through the denominator that is increasing again. We therefore get
Left hand side prime is the second round level, whereas right hand side doubleprime is the second round level of labor demand before the change of the cutoff.
We know that L d (1 − u ld (θ ld )) > L d (1 − u ld (θ ld )) so that [q ld (θ ld ) + ψq hd (θ hd )] < [q ld (θ ld ) + ψq hd (θ hd )] has to be true, otherwise the equality sign in equation (47) does not hold. If that is true we find that the cutoff increases to z * ' due to lower labor costs, which raises labor demand even more so that we get
both sides adjust again so that
] must be true, otherwise the equality sign in equation (49) does not hold. Figure 2 illustrates the effects at work by plotting the left side of the labor market clearing condition, Γ L , that is independent of unemployment benefits, and the right side, Γ R , which depends on the unemployment benefits through its dependence on wages. It is enough to show the effects for one skill-type since we first focus on the non-skill biased effects that affect both type of skills equally. The first effect is the direct effect as derived analytically above. A reduction in b shifts Γ R up in the (Γ R , θ) space due to higher demand for intermediates. The restriction βθ k + η+λ m(θ k ) < (1−β) c k must be fulfilled in order to secure that q k (θ) > 0. Furthermore, it secures that the indirect effect through θ will be less than the direct effect so that the total production costs after the government intervention are lower. The reason is that this restriction for θ rules out any jumps in q and thus in Γ R so that Γ L , and Γ R converge as depicted in Figure 2 until supply equals demand associated with a change of θ from θ 1 to θ 2 . This indirect effect arises only because the labor market is not in equilibrium anymore, which is accompanied by changes in wages. Yet, if q rises above its initial value, as it could be the case when Γ R is asymptotic, unemployment would have to increase as well. This cannot be the case as long as q increases only in order to facilitate a reduction in unemployment. Thus, q l a l (z) + q h a h (z) (the initial labor cost in sector z before the reform) must be higher than q l a l (z) + q h a h (z) (the total labor costs after the reform) since unemployment has to be decreasing in both skill groups. From equation (7) we know that this is associated with a shift of the unit cost schedule down associated with a higher z * .
The range of active industries increases at the extensive margin and as proved in Lemma 1, further boosts labor demand and shifts Γ R in the same direction as the intensive margin effect that led to a rise of the equilibrium market tightness from θ 1 to θ 2 . Unemployment has to adjust a second time in order to restore labor market equilibrium again. The second effect goes in the same direction so that the final equilibrium is reached in θ 3 , associated with a lower rate of unemployment and a lower price of the intermediate goods price. Unemployment decreases due to ∂u k ∂θ k < 0, which follows from equation (23) . due to the fact that z * is the lower bound of active industries at foreign. There is no direct effect of unemployment benefits on Γ R due to the assumption that the foreign government does not react to the labor market reforms at home. The increase in the cutoff shifts Γ R down followed by simultaneous increase in unemployment and decrease in wages through the adjustment of the equilibrium market tightness from θ 1 to θ 2 . This scenario is illustrated in Figure 3 . Unemployment increases in both skill-groups due to ∂u k ∂θ k < 0, which follows from equation (23) . On the aggregate level capital demand is pinned down by 
Skill-biased effects of institutional changes
Suppose that unemployment benefits enter the high-skilled workers outside option with a very low preference parameter ι h . For the sake of simplicity we focus on the scenario where ι h = 0 so that the reduction of the replacement rate has zero effects on high-skilled wages. Increased demand for high-skilled can be met only by increases in the high-skilled wages so that wage inequality is rising due to the skill-biased labor market reforms.
The direct and indirect effects on wages and intermediate good prices. One can apply exactly the same prove as derived for the non-skill biased labor market reforms using Figure 2 , at least for low-skilled. For high-skilled we use equation (43). We know that there is no direct effect but the denominator decreases due to the partial effect on q l , which translates into
Unemployment must also decrease in order to restore labor market equilibrium, which will lead to a decrease of the right hand side through the denominator that is increasing again. We therefore get
Left hand side prime is the second round level of labor supply, whereas right hand double-prime is the second round level of labor demand before the change of the cutoff. We know that
] must be true, otherwise the equality sign in equation (53) does not hold. If that is true we find that the cutoff increases to z * ' due to lower labor costs, which raises labor demand even more.
The effects can be illustrated exactly as for Proposition 2 using Figure 2 the following adjustment processes. Firstly, labor demand for both type of skills increased due to the higher domestic output. Secondly, there is excess capital demand at home but excess capital supply at foreign. Capital owners reallocate capital from foreign to home through foreign direct investment iff capital rentals remain constant. Thirdly, both countries demand goods from the whole continuum of industries. Thus, home will export more but import less. Foreign consumers benefit from lower export prices but home consumers are worse off because of higher import prices. Unemployment in the foreign country must rise in both skill groups as the economy contracts and less labor is used to produce low-and highskill specific intermediates.
Cooperative labor market reforms
One-sided labor market reforms by one country's government without interventions in countries that are integrated through trade and foreign direct investment fosters unemployment in the non-reforming country. Reforms that are skill-biased in that mainly the low-skilled are directly affected benefit the high-skilled in the reforming country through the effects at the extensive margin. Those spillover effects can be mitigated by joint labor market reforms implemented by all governments within the community. Suppose that both governments reduce unemployment benefits such that the unit cost schedule in both countries shift such that the cutoff remains unchanged. Wages and unemployment of the low-skilled would be decreasing in both countries but the effects at the extensive margin would be zero without an effect on foreign direct investments or the pattern of trade between both countries.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, this paper's main contribution is to extend the Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) workers are heterogeneous facilitates to distinguish between reforms that equally affect all workers and reforms that are skill-biased in that only low-skilled are affected. We are able to show that high-skilled benefit from those skill-based labor market reforms through higher wages but lower unemployment, whereas foreign workers loose in terms of unemployment irrespective their level of skill. It is also possible to show that those institutional changes not only affect workers' wages and unemployment, those reforms also indirectly affect FDI flows across countries.
Surging labor costs render FDI more attractive and therefore lead to an increase in FDI outflows accompanied by lower wages and higher rates of unemployment.
One possible policy implication is that high-skilled workers benefit from those skillbiased labor market reforms and that governments should stick to joint labor market intervention in order to avoid negative spill-over effects.
A Proofs
Derivation of equation (20) . To derive the equilibrium tightness conditions for both high-and low-skill intermediate producers we need to derive and interact the wage and the job creation curves. To solve for the job creation curve equation (12) and (11) are combined so that
To solve for the wage curve we start with rearranging equation (16) as
Equation (11) can be rewritten as
Expanding equation (14) by subtracting (η + λ)U k on both sides gives
A solution for the outside option is obtained by combining equation (15), equation (55), and equation (12) as
Combining equation (58), (55), (56), and (59) gives
To solve for the equilibrium intermediate good price we can interact the wage curve (19) and the job creation curve (54) and solve for k (z)
We substitute with q due to independence of z. Using the Bellman equations we have shown that wages are independent from industries, which also implies that intermediate goods do not depend on the industry identifier z.
Proof of Proposition (1), part b). The first derivative of equations (8) and (9) is positive since
Derivation of the Labor Market Clearing condition. We know that firms' demand for intermediate goods is given by equation (24) where we can use (2) to substitute out x(z) and (7) to solve for (25) or (28) in order to derive a simpler version of the LMC and in order to calibrate the whole model.
Existence of an equilibrium. First, notice that the left hand of the LMC curve Γ L is well behaved due to the convexity of the Beveridge curve. For lim θ→∞ Γ L = L since lim θ→∞ u(θ) = 0. Let the equilibrium market tightness go to zero and we find that lim θ→0 Γ L = 0 since lim θ→0 u(θ) = 1. Thus, for θ = 0 we have full unemployment and no worker is willing to search for a job. The right hand side of the LMC curve is also well behaved. Demand for intermediates hinges on the intermediate goods prices q k and q k depends on exogenous parameters and the equilibrium market tightness. However, equation (20) is asymptotic in θ so that the necessary restriction for θ k is
to secure that q k (θ) > 0. However, this is not a strong assumption for reasonable values of the exogenous parameters. It is enough to apply the Leibniz rule on Γ R in order to derive
− ζ ϕ(z)E(a k (z)) 2 [q l a l (z) + q h a h (z)] 2 dz < 0 (69) which implies that ∂Γ R ∂θ k < 0. To derive this proof the assumption that the upper and the lower bound remain constant was made. The intermediate good price for the other skill group is also implicitly assumed constant and optimal. However, there is an interaction between both skill groups. A change in the price of the other intermediate good shifts the regarded labor demand curve Γ R . Therefore, given the upper and lower bounds of z there exists exactly one combination for both market tightness for which both skill group's LMC curves are jointly satisfied. (2) and (3). The first derivative of the Equilibrium tightness curve with respect to b is
Proof of Proposition
This partial effect is accompanied by indirect adjustments as discussed in the main part of the paper, where we show that production costs falling on input of intermediates must be lower after the reform. This shifts the respective unit cost curve down. Again the former equilibrium z * is not optimal anymore and has to adjust.
The unit cost schedules at home and foreign. The following graph, Figure 
